



Cyberterrorism

Identifying and Responding to New Threats

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About Me – Matthew G. Devost

- Researching Implications of Information Technology on National Security since 1993.
- Creator and Director of the first Coalition Vulnerability Assessment Team (U.S., NATO, Canada, U.K., Australia, New Zealand)
- Founding Director of the Terrorism Research Center, Inc.
- Award winning author on information terrorism issues
- Directly involved in many assessments around the world (commercial and gov't)
- Support to international corporations and governments including FBI, Joint Staff, Microsoft, Citigroup, Swedish Government, PCCIP, NSTAC, Defense Science Board, DISA, OMNCS, FAA, etc.



Public Web site



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ABOUT - CONTACT - CONSULTING

The Terrorism Research Center is dedicated to informing the public of the phenomena of terrorism and information warfare. This site features essays and thought pieces on current issues, as well as links to other terrorism documents, research and resources. Navigate the site by clicking on the area of interest.

U.S. Homeland Attack September 11, 2001



**Advanced
Counterterrorism Operations**
TRC Training Session - Atlanta, GA
January 28-30, 2002 (click for details)

Analysis

Original analysis, essays and commentary on terrorism and information warfare.

References

Calendar of Significant Dates, travel advisories and other references.

Profiles

Profiles of counterterrorism groups and terrorist organizations.

Documents

Counterterrorism material available in electronic form.

WWW Links

Comprehensive list of terrorism related web pages.

InfoWar

The Information Warfare Research Center provides resources on infowar, information terrorism and infrastructure protection. Also contains the [IW RealNews page](#), the [InfoWar Portal](#), and the [IW Events Database](#).

Interest

Top News Stories

['Mujihadeen' Hackers Take Out US Government Sites](#)



[The high-tech hunt for terrorist lairs](#)

[Arafat picks words over actions](#)

[Anti-abortionist is named suspect in anthrax hoaxes](#)

[Anthrax found in Conn. Mail Center](#)

Terrorism Bookstore



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TRC Recent and Current Initiatives



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Quotes



The most likely perpetrators of cyber attacks on critical infrastructures are terrorists and criminal groups rather than nation-states.

– The Gilmore Commission

Not “Crude and Unsophisticated”

Cyber terrorism is extremely difficult to guard against. Cyber terrorists are often well educated, with the expertise and equipment to stay ahead of advances in protective security. Yet, the havoc wreaked by a major cyber-attack could be enormous.

- 1999 Report of the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence (CANADA)

Information Terrorism Overview



Is this a hard target or a soft target?
Picture of Mount Pony Bunker, Culpeper, VA

Critical Infrastructure Threat Matrix

<i>Infrastructure Threat Matrix</i>		Target	
		<i>Physical</i>	<i>Digital</i>
Tool	<i>Physical</i>	(a) Conventional Terrorism (Oklahoma City Bombing)	(b) IRA attack on London Square Mile, 4 Oct 1992
	<i>Digital</i>	(c) Spoof Air Traffic Control to crash plane.	(d) “Pure” Information Terrorism (Trojan horse in public switched network)

Cell (d) the most difficult to detect and counter

Information Terrorism

Recent Threat Activity






**“Hacktivists” Of All Persuasions
Take Their Struggle To The Web**

Threat Trends - Agents

- Automated tools allow for unsophisticated hackers to launch devastating attacks (e.g. Mafiaboy)
- Increasing focus on CNA within terrorist organizations (prior to 9/11/01)
 - Younger, technical membership
 - Sponsoring graduate degrees in computer science
- As physical security measures are enhanced (post 9/11/01) and resources are restricted, electronic attack becomes even attractive, especially against critical infrastructure targets

Past Threat Profile (Time for a new one?)




↑
“the most organized and
systematic attack the
Pentagon has seen to
date”

Threat Trends - Tools

- Attack tools are increasingly automated and stealthy
- Distributed Denial of Service
- Rapidly propagating worms
- Multi-functional and cross platform attack tools
- Exploit emerging technologies (e.g. wireless)
- Incredibly dynamic capabilities emerging
 - “Goner” attacking via email and instant messaging

Attacking Wireless Networks



Wireless Networks – Route 7, NOVA

Network Stumbler - [Stumbler.exe]

File Edit View Options Window Help

Channels
SSIDs
Filters

MAC	SSID	Name	Ch.	Vendor	Ty	W.	SN	Sign.	Noi	SN	Latitude	Longitude	First Se	Last Se	Sig	Noi	Fla	Bea
004096340...	101		6	Cisco	AP			-57	-100	37	N38.9292	W77.2450	15:02:57	15:13:25				0021 100
004096299...	cisco6		6	Cisco	AP			-57	-100	41	N38.9290	W77.2457	15:02:21	15:13:25				0021 100
00022D032...	WcomBDS		1	Agere	AP	Yes		-02	-99	15	N38.9290	W77.2414	14:59:39	15:02:40				0011 100
00022D090...	WaveLAN Network		10	Agere	AP			-92	-80	4	N38.9278	W77.2377	14:59:01	14:59:04				0001 100
00022D1D...	1012be		10	Agere	AP			-08	-100	11	N38.9278	W77.2376	14:59:59	14:59:32				0001 100
00022D032...	WcomBDS		11	Agere	AP	Yes		-93	-90	5	N38.9275	W77.2361	14:50:30	14:50:30				0011 100
00045A2E6...	linksys		1	Linksys	AP			-93	-97	4	N38.9280	W77.2360	14:58:28	14:58:29				0001 100
00022D081...	WaveLAN		3	Agere	AP			-95	-97	2	N38.9244	W77.2319	14:56:26	14:56:28				0001 100
00022D04E...	WaveLAN Network		3	Agere	AP			-93	-97	3	N38.9236	W77.2312	14:56:19	14:56:22				0001 100
00601DF03...	WaveLAN Network		3	Agere	AP			-89	-97	8	N38.9238	W77.2314	14:56:11	14:56:35				0001 100
00409637C...	tsunami		6	Cisco	AP	Yes		-94	-99	5	N38.9226	W77.2301	14:56:08	14:56:08				0031 100
00601D232...	WAFNET1		9	Agere	AP	Yes		-77	-99	21	N38.9229	W77.2305	14:56:00	14:56:19				0011 100
004096348...	tsunami		6	Cisco	AP	Yes		-91	-94	3	N38.9223	W77.2298	14:55:56	14:55:58				0031 100
00901B092...	default		6	Qumt...	AP			-78	-88	19	N38.9227	W77.2277	14:55:46	14:55:51				0005 80
003085802...	InfoSec Airport		5	Apple	AP	Yes		-77	-88	21	N38.9229	W77.2305	14:55:40	14:56:19				0011 100
00508B992...	VTNNW		6	Comp	AP			-77	-88	20	N38.9229	W77.2274	14:55:38	14:55:47				0005 80
004096345...	tsunami		6	Osco	AP	Yes		-80	-100	18	N38.9232	W77.2264	14:54:04	14:55:52				0031 100
080046250...	25073c		1	Sony	AP	Yes		-84	-98	13	N38.9223	W77.2263	14:54:02	14:55:24				0011 100
00022D0B7...	0u709		1	Agere	AP	Yes		-93	-97	4	N38.9174	W77.2252	14:50:40	14:50:40				0011 100
00045A0F3...	Linksys		6	Linksys	AP			-80	-99	17	N38.9169	W77.2311	14:47:45	14:48:13				0001 100
00601DF22...	Interknowledge Wireless		3	Agere	AP	Yes		-72	-99	25	N38.9155	W77.2300	14:47:16	14:47:39				0011 100
00601DF0E...	MFN-0075		5	Agere	AP			-93	-98	5	N38.9163	W77.2280	14:45:30	14:48:40				0001 100
00601DF0E...	MFN-0075		7	Agere	AP			-95	-100	13	N38.9132	W77.2260	14:45:14	14:45:53				0001 100
004096396...	ANY		1	Cisco	AP	Yes		-67	-90	29	N38.9132	W77.2260	14:44:52	14:45:49				0011 100
004096396...	ANY		1	Cisco	AP	Yes		-56	-99	39	N38.9131	W77.2259	14:44:44	14:50:16				0011 100
004096444...	VIDEO		11	Cisco	AP			-62	-99	33	N38.9131	W77.2259	14:44:35	14:50:03				0001 100
004005DF8...	kipstord		6	D-Link	AP			-87	-99	12	N38.9165	W77.2282	14:44:28	14:49:17				0005 80
00601D1E9...	Madillon Springs		11	Agere	AP			-80	-98	17	N38.9109	W77.2250	14:44:03	14:44:12				0001 100
0004E20E6...	WLAN		11	AP	Yes			-73	-99	26	N38.9112	W77.2258	14:44:02	14:44:17				0011 100
00045AD1...	WolskiMNET		6	Linksys	AP	Yes		-86	-99	11	N38.9103	W77.2238	14:43:48	14:43:50				0011 100
004096408...	tsunami		6	Cisco	AP			-92	-96	4	N38.9109	W77.2250	14:43:13	14:44:02				0021 100
004096422...	VIDEO		11	Cisco	AP			-54	-100	44	N38.9131	W77.2259	14:40:47	14:50:19				0001 100
004096399...	AetherSoftware		11	Osco	AP			-72	-100	25	N38.9168	W77.2290	14:40:46	14:50:28				0001 100
004005DE6...	default		6	D-Link	AP			-92	-97	4	N38.9137	W77.2199	14:40:40	14:42:20				0005 80
004096311...	tsunami		6	Cisco	AP			-90	-97	7	N38.9121	W77.2205	14:40:37	14:40:37				0021 100
004096348...	mdemo		6	Cisco	AP			-92	-98	5	N38.9101	W77.2159	14:40:09	14:42:38				0021 100
004096298...	8		7	Cisco	AP			-89	-100	10	N38.9112	W77.2226	14:31:39	14:31:40				0001 100
00045A0E8...	linksys		6	Linksys	AP	Yes		-91	-95	4	N38.9106	W77.2461	14:30:06	14:30:06				0011 100
00045ACF...	linksys	Pisom I	6, 11	Linksys	AP			-91	-99	7			14:18:04	14:18:59				0001 100
00045A26D...	linksys	Pisom I	6	Linksys	AP			-77	-99	21			14:17:49	14:19:35				0001 100

Ready


No wireless card found

GPS: Serial port unavailable

Start Disabled - BlackBer... nvca-cyberterron... NetStumbler Network Stumbler...

9:16 AM

Evolution of Hacker Tools



Threat Trends - Targets

Kill with a borrowed sword...



Threat Techniques

Masquerading

Electronic Warfare

Intrusion/Hacking

Directed Energy

PSYOP

Diversion

Insider Placement

Distributed Denial of Service

Spoofing

Signals Intel

Substitution/Mod.

Deception




Misinformation

Denial of Service

Malicious Code

Blue = Most attractive to terrorist organizations.

HERF Threats?



Traditional Threat Goals

- Unauthorized Disclosure of Data
 - Access to secrets!
- Corruption of Data
 - Can no longer trust the data we have
- Denial of Service
 - You will not communicate or perform other needed functions.
- Disruption of Communications
 - Make it harder to communicate
 - Communications become unreliable

Threat Goals - The Future


- Disruption of Social Integrity
 - Target Critical Infrastructures (Decrease Confidence)
 - Create public panic and distrust
 - Disrupt financial systems
 - Kill power to major city during play-off celebration
- Deter Force Projection
 - The Somalia Scenario, infrastructure attacks, PSYOP
- Fund Threat Activities
 - IW in support of making money.
 - Influence markets, etc.
 - E.g. - Advance knowledge of press releases, labor statistics.

Influencing Markets Seem Far Fetched?

NEW YORK (AP) -- A Houston man was arrested Thursday on charges that he violated securities laws by posting a phony press release on the Internet that caused the stock of Lucent Technologies to plunge in value.

Manhattan prosecutors accused Fred Moldofsky, 43, of causing the value of the stock in the world's top manufacturer of communications equipment to fall as much as 3.6 percent, from \$62.62 to \$60.37. **That trimmed the value of the company on Wall Street by \$7.1 billion.**

The Power of Influence?



Source: Wanja Eric Naef, www.iwar.org.uk

The Known Threats

- Criminal Hackers
 - Credit card/bank fraud, information theft, and personal attacks
 - Malicious intent!
- Curious Hackers
 - New exploits, conferences, and white papers
 - Have merged into community as security experts
 - advising the government
 - L0pht/@Stake/White House, DefCon conferences, etc

The Known Threats (II)

- Corporate Espionage
 - Hacking for competitive advantage
 - See Winkler - “Corporate Espionage”
 - See Fialka - “War by Other Means”
 - What’s next? Creating competitive advantage?

The Known Threats

- 100+ Nations developing capabilities (5/18/2000)
- Russia - Scared of the IW threat
 - Yelstin “While maintaining our nuclear potential at the proper level, we need to devote more attention to developing the entire range of means of information warfare.”
- China - IW is the next people’s war
 - “Unrestricted Warfare” book released
 - Significant implications!
- Israel - Analyzer “Damn Good!”

The Emerging Threats

- Terrorist Organizations
 - Using the web as information tool
 - Collect targeting information (reduces casing exposure)
 - Coordinate activities (e.g. shoe bomber email)
 - Soliciting hackers?
 - Electronic attacks against counterterrorism firms
- Hacktivists
 - Winn Schwartau, “If we had your skills (hackers) in the 60s, the 80s would have never happened!”
 - Memphis Example, Electronic Disturbance Theatre
 - **Earth Liberation Front** announces inclusion of electronic attacks in arsenal

Hactivists and Activists

- Combining electronic and physical protest tactics
- Increasingly sophisticated support infrastructure for protests against international organizations/meetings
 - Use of pagers, text messaging, Internet, cell phones, etc.
 - The use of electronic devices allows them to dynamically respond to law enforcement action
 - Monitoring airwaves for intelligence

The Emerging Threats II

- Sleeper Agents
 - Already in place and waiting for attack?
 - Cyber and Human?
 - Don't dismiss the potential for “insider placement” to meet a specific objective
- Lawyers
 - Legal liability associated with the lack of a diligent defense could have a significant impact on infrastructure operation
 - Department of Interior shutdown

The Emerging Threats III

- Organized Crime
 - Crime syndicates and gangs acting as domestic “mercenaries” for terrorist organizations
 - Could use disparate groups in a coordinated manner for sustained attacks
 - Proxy for physical attacks or institutional knowledge/human system attacks (e.g. assassination)
- Nation States
 - Mask action as originating from terrorists or rogue nations to achieve objective without attribution

Migrating Towards New Technologies

- Aum Shinryko cult developed software for over 80 Japanese firms and 10 agencies and was accessing law enforcement data
- Islamic Hacker Networks being formed
- Numerous low-level attacks against public information systems (e.g. Internet Black Tigers)
- Propaganda web sites increasing
- Private chat rooms, message boards, mailing lists
- Developing attack tools (virus, DOS)

The Threat Spectrum

- **Those with the intent, lack the capability**
 - Protective membrane of technology is quickly evaporating (COTS attack capabilities, MafiaBoy)
 - Long-term planning cycle could already be in effect
- **Those with the capability, lack the intent**
 - Economic interdependence, global condemnation, fear of conventional response create deterrence factor
 - “Unrestricted” type attacks become attractive if they can be launched anonymously or if framing can be conducted to divert response to a third party (e.g. bin Laden)

Why Information Terrorism?

- Continued focus within national security apparatus
 - PCCIP, PDD63, CIAO, NIPC, InfraGard, FIDNet, MOONLIGHT MAZE, SOLAR SUNRISE, ELIGIBLE RECEIVER!
 - Outsider perspective - “something significant here”
- Significant capability to disrupt the lives of citizenry
 - Attack launched from distributed environment - not geographically centralized. (targets too!)
 - Fits current terrorist mode of operation (asymmetrical cells)
 - Natural migration when physical resources are constrained

Why Information Terrorism? (II)

- Bytes not blood
 - Shock value of IW attack would not be as significant as a traditional terrorist attack, but the actual impact could be greater from a political perspective.
- Nearly impossible for military response to IW attack
 - "We reserve the right to respond in any way appropriate: through covert action, through military action, any one of the tools available to the president," Richard Clarke said at a Senate Judiciary subcommittee hearing on cyberterrorism.
 - Where do you send the tomahawks?
 - How do you determine who is responsible?
 - Are you every completely sure you've got the right perp (think unrestricted warfare)!

Asymmetrical Networks

.... The information revolution favors and strengthens network forms of organizations, while making life difficult for hierarchical forms.... It means conflict will increasingly be waged by “networks,” rather than by “hierarchies”. It means that whoever masters the network form stands to gain major advantages in the new epoch...

- John Arquilla and David Ron,

In Athena's Camp : Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age

Defending Against the Threat




Information Terrorism Toolkit?

Laptop with cellular phone, GPS unit, police scanner and misc. electronics.

Current Response Model



It Could Happen to You!



Threat Challenges


- Understanding the Threat
 - Real Attacks vs. False Alarms
 - Solar Sunrise, Moonlight Maze, or Red Dawn?
- Threat Analysis, Warning and Crisis Management Capability Needed!
 - PDD 63 calls for Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) – Where are we now?
 - Must facilitate information exchange between private and public sectors
 - Intrusion Detection and Network Monitoring capabilities need to be enhanced
 - Contextual threat assessments are required

Threat Challenges (II)

- Understand Our Vulnerabilities
 - Vigorous vulnerability analysis and red teaming required to understand our own weaknesses and secure potential targets
 - Oracle to Neo - “Know Thyself”
 - Requires significant expertise
 - Lesson of JWID CVAT - “Tools are not talent!”
- Security as a Design Concept
- Active Security Research Community

Searching for the Silver Bullet

- Scanning Tools
- Network Firewalls
- Intrusion Detection
- Virtual Private Networks (VPN)
- Encryption



Technology is not enough!

Avoid the "Silver Bullet" mentality when addressing technology deployment within your enterprise. Technology is not enough! Technology should only be deployed in support of a comprehensive security plan.

The Silver Concepts

- Diligent Defense
- Comprehensive Assessment
- Intelligence
- Response and Reconstitution

Diligent Defense

- Best practices help prevent the majority of attacks
- Policies and procedures are essential
- Formalized Risk Management process required (including valid threat models)
- Posture should reflect articulated information security policies
- I&W capability to determine when threat profile is changing


Assessment

- Strategic
 - An adversary can acquire a substantial capability without a significant investment, long-term development cycles, or readily observable testing or deployment
- Threat
 - Should be realistic
 - Feeds into Risk Management Process
- Self
 - Constant self assessment
 - Vulnerability assessments, certification and accreditation, red teaming – use the Experts!

The Power of Intelligence?

“The only effective way of countering terrorism is with good intelligence.”

– David Kimche, Deputy Head - Mossad



There is nothing new about this!

Recognize the validity of adapting old models for new threats.

Intelligence

- ELIGIBLE RECEIVER had useful lessons, but so did SOLAR SUNRISE
 - *detection* of attack
 - source
 - strategy and scope of attack
- What about MOONLIGHT MAZE!?
- Accurate intelligence is only way to ensure proper response
- To maximize value, we must find mechanisms that allow for intelligence sharing (threat, vulnerability and incident information)


Response

- Plan and exercise your response capability
- All phases of the threat
 - Preemption
 - Active defense and attack containment
 - Damage control and mitigation
 - Reconstitution
 - Eliminate vulnerabilities as well as source of attack
- As with all other defensive mechanisms, this requires public/private cooperation, continuous assessment, and frequent and aggressive exercising.

Conclusion

Country Code: from mask

DE
IT
JP
Other
SE
UK
US



Is this a hard target or a soft target?

Source: Internet Mapping Project – Bell Labs

For More Information

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Technical Defense, Inc. – www.technicaldefense.com

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